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INTRODUCTION
Asked why Donald Trump won the 2016 Presidential 
election, pundits give about as many answers as there 
are, well, pundits. Answers include, for example, 
Comey’s announcement of the reopening of the Clinton 
investigation; Hillary Clinton’s poor candidacy; Mrs. 
Clinton’s e-mail scandal; Russian interference in the 
election process; the fact that Presidents are not elected 
by popular vote;  Trump’s supporters’ addiction to “The 
Apprentice;” and so on.
Although these answers may each have some validity, 
none is particularly sociological. And none feels like 
an adequate answer to the basic question: what made 
a sufficient slice of the American populace so ready 
and perhaps eager to vote for a political novice, with 
some evident peccadillos, that any of these peculiarities, 
or even some combination of them, could tip the 
scale? This really is the central question of this paper, 
one that we address through two lenses: a cultural lag 
lens and a cultural backlash lens. The former leads 
us to believe that support for Trump’s candidacy was 
born out of economic insecurity in a substantial part 
of the electorate. The latter, that it was the result of 
a resentment of a “silent revolution” in attitudes, a 
revolution that deprived many whites of their sense of 
privilege in American society.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Using the “Cultural Lag” Lens
We thought that the theme of this issue of SBG, 
cultural lag, might hold the clue to Donald Trump’s 
electoral success.  We knew that at least one faction 
of Trump supporters (e.g., white working-class men 
and their families) had experienced a buffeting by the 
winds of economic and technological change. While 
such changes also affected working-class people of 
other racial and ethnic backgrounds, white working-
class men and their families were more susceptible to 
Trump’s campaign themes about job creation and job 
security.  
The sources of this buffeting have been well 
documented. By the 1960s, in fact, the switch to 
a knowledge-based economy in the United States 
had begun and the industrial economy began to 
thin. Managers and engineers, always interested in 
increasing productivity, produced automated factories 
that employed fewer people. By the 1970s, corporations 
began to replace old factories with new ones in countries 
with low-cost labor. Initially this loss of manufacturing 
jobs hit black men hardest, but by the 1980s the losses 
hit less-educated whites as well (Kenschaft, Clark and 
Ciambrone 2016: 41-42).  The more recent acceleration 
of computing power, what Thomas Friedman (2016) calls 
“the supernova,” promises to threaten the traditional 
working-class job market even more.
The effects of all this economic and technological 
change have been uneven in the United States, as 
elsewhere.  Real family incomes for the top 20 percent 
of families rose by a little over 75 percent between 1967 
and 2013. Meanwhile those for the next 40 percent 
rose by less than 30 percent, and have actually fallen 
substantially since 2000, and those for the next 40 
percent have risen much less, and also fallen since 2000 
(Reeves 2015).  Social scientists as politically disparate as 
Charles Murray (2012) and Robert Putnam (2015) have 
pointed to an increasing bifurcation in the experiences, 
opportunities, and prospects for children between what 
Murray calls “The New Upper Class” and the “New 
Lower Class.”  Murray demonstrates convincingly that 
this divide is as significant among white Americans as it 
is among any other group.  
The relationship between the income inequality 
and opportunity inequality has not been simple or 
instantaneous. Murray (2012) and Putnam (2015) both 
suggest that it took decades for economic troubles 
“to undermine family structures and community 
supports” (Putnam 2015: 228). As marriage became less 
common and divorce more common among the “new 
lower class,” children experienced gaps in parenting, 
developing lower commitments to education and lower 
chances for intergenerational mobility.  Fear regarding 
and resentment for these situations was natural, as 
well as for government actors who continued, as one 
of Hochschild’s (2016: 52)) respondents put it, “come 
down on the little guy,” over-regulating the little guy, but 
under-regulating guys at the top.
 In his 2015 book, Our Kids: The American Dream 
in Crisis, Putnam under-scored the potential for 
“antidemocratic extremism” that the presence of a 
new lower class, faced increasingly with few personal 
opportunities, but also few opportunities for their 
children, poses.  As he put it:
[U]nder severe economic and international pressures . . 
. the “inert” mass might suddenly prove highly volatile and 
open to manipulation by anti-democratic demagogues at the 
ideological extremes (pp. 239-240).
So one view of Trump’s victory suggests that 
many of his supporters were victims of long-term 
economic upheaval in the U. S., seeking to express 
their dissatisfaction with the way the country had 
left them and their children behind. They voted for 
Trump, according to this view, because he spoke to 
their economic insecurities and promised to create 
the jobs that would enable them to once again achieve 
respectable middle-class status for themselves and a 
hopeful future for their children. An added benefit 
was that Donald Trump promised to shake up the 
Washington establishment.  
More generally, Donald Trump has been viewed as 
embodying the characteristics of a populist candidate, 
one who extols the wisdom of “ordinary people” ahead 
of the views of elites (e.g., media pundits and elected 
politicians). Populism, according to Inglehart and 
Norris (2016: 6-7) is a philosophy that often favors 
the personal power of charismatic leaders, preferring 
direct majoritarian democratic rule over a system of 
checks and balances.  Donald Trump’s embrace of these 
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principles, the cultural lag perspective implies, made 
him particularly attractive to people with less education, 
lower levels of income and wealth, and a greater sense 
that the economy was failing because it promised to 
address their economic insecurities.  
Therefore, the cultural lag perspective led us to 
propose the following four hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: People with lower incomes would have 
been more likely to vote  for Trump than people with higher 
incomes.
Hypothesis 2: People with less wealth would have been 
more likely to vote for Trump than people with more wealth.
Hypothesis 3: People with less education would have 
been more likely to vote  for Trump than people with more 
education.
Hypothesis 4:  People who felt the economy was doing 
badly would have been more likely to vote for Trump than 
people who felt the economy was doing  well.
 Using the “Cultural Backlash” Lens 
“Cultural backlash” refers to a reaction against 
progressive cultural movements. The cultural backlash 
perspective can be seen as focusing on second-level, 
attitudinal implications of economic and technological 
change, especially for people who may previously 
have seen themselves as privileged in society, but now 
feel victimized by liberal movements and attitudes. 
This perspective suggests that there has been a “silent 
revolution” in values in many Western nations, 
coinciding with the rise of knowledge-based economies 
(e.g., Inglehart 1977), that has been associated with a 
rise of multiculturalism, advocacy for environmental 
protection, human rights, and gender equality. Like 
many such “revolutions,” this one has inspired a 
backlash most particularly among those who have seen 
their privilege and status challenged by liberals and by 
economic change. These revolutions have left many 
whites feeling, as Arlie Hochschild’s (2016) book title 
states, Strangers in Their Own Land.
Hochschild’s qualitative research into the lives and 
convictions of conservatives, who, in her study, were 
largely white, uncovers deep-seated fears of being 
culturally eclipsed.  Her Louisiana respondents did in 
fact fear economic decline, but were conceivably even 
more motivated by resentments about “line cutters,” 
groups who seem, through affirmative action programs 
of the federal government, to have been given a leg up 
in colleges and universities, jobs and welfare programs. 
Hochschild summarizes:
Women, immigrants, refugees, public sector workers—
where will it end? Your money is running through a liberal 
sympathy sieve you don’t control or agree with. These are 
opportunities you’d have loved to have had in your day—and 
either you should have had them when you were young or 
the young shouldn’t be getting them now.  It’s not fair (2016: 
137).
Hochschild is careful about labeling her respondents, 
and by extension other, primarily white, conservatives, 
as racist, sexist, anti-immigrant or homophobic.  Many, 
she implies, probably are racist by definitions used by 
sociologists—e.g., believers “in a natural hierarchy that 
places blacks at the bottom” (2016: 147).  She points out, 
however, that most are explicitly not racist by their own 
definitions of the word—people who use the “N” word 
or who hate blacks.  We too would like to avoid such 
labels.
Donald Trump spoke to the sense of unfairness felt 
by many “new lower class” whites.  He openly criticized 
immigrants from Mexico and Muslim countries, and 
was cheered. Openly demanded that “Black Lives 
Matter” protesters be kicked out of his rallies, and 
garnered vocal crowd support. Hochschild makes this 
observation about a rally she observed:
He [Trump] was throwing off not only a set of “politically 
correct” attitudes, but a set of feeling rules—that is, a set of 
ideas about the right way to feel regarding blacks, women, 
immigrants, gays . . . (2016: 227).
  
The cultural backlash perspective led us to propose a 
number of other hypotheses about the 2016 presidential 
election. Specifically, we came to expect:
Hypothesis 5: People who feel that blacks have not been 
particularly disadvantaged are more likely than others to 
have voted for Trump.
Hypothesis 6: People who would like to halt immigration 
into the country are more likely than others to have voted for 
Trump.
Hypothesis 7: People who feel that discrimination against 
gays and lesbians is tolerable are more likely than others to 
have voted for Trump.
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Hypothesis 8: People who feel that discrimination against 
women is tolerable are more likely to have voted for Trump 
than others.
Our reading of the cultural lag and cultural backlash 
perspectives together led us to believe that, at the state 
level, those state populations expressing the greatest 
overall well being would be less likely to vote for Trump 
than those expressing the least overall well being. 
Hence, we proposed our last (ninth) hypothesis:
Hypothesis 9: At the state level, Trump’s margin of 
victory will have been inversely related to the proportion 
of the population expressing a sense of overall well being, 
even once the proportion of the population of the population 
classifying itself as Republican is controlled.
RESEARCH APPROACH and PRINCIPAL 
VARIABLES
This article is based primarily on secondary analysis 
of two timely data sets: Gallup’s (2017) “State of the 
States” poll results for 2016 and the American National 
Election Study (ANES) for 2016 and 2012.1  We use the 
Gallup data to determine the degree to which Trump’s 
margin of victory (or defeat) over Clinton in the 50 
states (data from The Cook Political Report, 2017) can 
be explained by two variables: the percentage of state 
residents who identify as Republican or who identify 
as independent but say they lean toward Republican 
and a state’s score on Gallup’s overall “Well-Being” 
index, “made up of five elements of well-being that are 
the core components of the best possible life: purpose, 
social, financial, community and physical.”  Our goal 
is to ascertain the degree to which a lack of “well-
being,” the closest measure of state-wide despair we 
have found, can account for Trump’s success, above and 
beyond what could have expected based on the political 
identification of states’ populations.
Since 1948, ANES has employed a sample of 
American voters in every presidential election in order 
to help researchers determine the characteristics and 
attitudes of voters that led to the election result in 
each presidential election.  We use the ANES data to 
determine how various indicators of voter economic 
insecurity and cultural backlash, at the individual, 
1 The ANES data were available through Berkeley University’s 
(2017) “Survey Documentation and Analysis” website.
rather than at the state, level may have contributed to 
Trump’s electoral success. We choose indicators based 
on their availability in both the 2012 presidential 
election, involving primarily Mitt Romney and Barack 
Obama and in order to estimate their relative salience 
in the 2016 election.  Comparing the two elections is 
crucial for determining the degree to which certain 
characteristics and attitudes stand out in the 2016 
election. Thus, for instance, even if we find that a 
concern about immigrants distinguished Trump voters 
from Clinton voters, we cannot be sure that this attitude 
was particularly salient in the 2016 election unless we 
can determine that it was less important in previous 
elections.
Our dependent variable in the 2016 election is 
whether a respondent voted for Clinton (coded 0) or 
Trump (coded 1).  Our dependent variable in the 2012 
election is whether s/he voted for Obama (coded 0) or 
Romney (coded 1).
We use four measures of economic status and possible 
insecurity as independent variables. Three of these tap 
respondents’ economic condition and the fourth, an 
attitude towards the economy.  The first independent 
variable is a measure of family income (INCOME).2 
The second independent variable is a rough measure 
of wealth, based on whether a respondent claimed to 
own stock or not (STOCK). The third independent 
variable is a measure of education (EDUCATION).3  The 
fourth independent variable is a measure of economic 
condition (ECONOMY).4  The cultural lag perspective 
leads us to expect that people with lower family income, 
without stocks, with less education and with negative 
ratings of the economy are more likely to have voted for 
Trump than people with higher incomes, with stocks, 
with more education and with positive ratings of the 
economy.
We also have four measures of the degree to which 
respondents are gripped by a negative reaction to 
progressive value changes—that is, are part of a cultural 
2 INCOME has 28 categories, ranging from “under $5,000” to 
“$250,000 or more.”
3 EDUCATION has five categories, ranging from “less than a high 
school credential” to “a graduate degree.”
4 ECONOMY is operationalized by a respondent’s rating of the 
economy on a five-category scale from “very good” to “very bad.”
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backlash against certain categories of people.  One 
measure has to do with the degree to which they disagree 
with the statement that “Blacks have gotten less than 
they deserve” (BLACKS).  A second measure focuses 
on the degree to which they think the media should 
pay less attention to discrimination against women 
(WOMEN).5  A third measure is whether they say “no” 
to the question “should laws protect gays and lesbians 
from job discrimination” (GAYS). And the fourth 
measure, a four-category scale measuring the degree 
to which respondents think that government should 
define unauthorized immigrants as felons and send 
them back to their home countries (IMMIGRANTS). 
Unfortunately, in regard to measuring anti-immigrant 
feeling, this last variable does not have the greatest 
face validity in the 2016 ANES survey. An alternative 
measure of this variable was available in the 2016. We 
could not use the alternative variable because there was 
no comparable indicator present in the 2012 survey.6 
However, analyses not presented here suggest that the 
more valid, alternative measure of anti-immigrant 
feeling actually shows a stronger association with 
presidential choice than IMMIGRANT, so using the 
variable IMMIGRANT in our analysis probably offers 
a conservative estimate of the degree to which anti-
immigrant sentiment drove Trump voters.
We use five control variables in our analyses: political 
party affiliation; race; gender; age; and the importance 
of religion to the respondent.7 Republicans were 
undoubtedly more likely to vote for Trump than voters 
with other political identifications.8 We expected that 
5 We want to point out that the wording of this statement may 
needlessly confuse voter attitudes towards women with their 
attitudes towards the media as well as their attitudes towards 
Hillary Clinton, a female candidate.  However, we found no more 
reliable indicator of attitudes towards women in the 2016 and 2012
6 One variable (available in 2016), based on a question about what 
should happen to United States immigration levels (from “increase 
them a lot” to “decrease them a lot”) does not confuse, as the 
variable IMMIGRANTS might be seen to do, attitudes towards 
immigration with attitudes towards illegal immigration. 
7 Political party affiliation is coded as Republican = 1 and not 
Republican = 0. Self-identified race is coded as 1 = white and 0 = 
not white. Gender (GENDER) is coded as 1 = female and 0 = male. 
Age (AGE) is coded as age in years; and the importance of religion 
to the respondent (RELIGION) is coded as 1 = religion important 
and 0 = religion not important.  
Republicans, whites, males, older voters, and people 
who said religion was important would be more likely 
to vote for Trump than non-Republicans, non-whites, 
females, younger voters and people who said religion 
was not important.
RESULTS
We report results from Pearson correlation and 
linear regression analyses for overwhelming theoretical 
considerations, despite the fact that many of our 
variables do not meet the assumptions required of such 
statistical techniques.9  Normally, it would be preferable 
to use logit or probit regression analysis, for instance, 
when the dependent variable is dichotomous, especially 
when one of the categories of the variable is relatively 
rare. But rarity is not a problem for the dependent 
variables in this analysis: all four candidates—Trump, 
Clinton, Romney and Obama—received substantial 
proportions of the votes.  And simple linear regression 
provides statistics—in this case, standardized regression 
coefficients (betas)—that enable the comparison of 
the strength of controlled associations of various 
independent variables on the dependent variable. These 
are crucial comparisons for this study.  In analyses not 
reported in this paper, we have done logit regression 
and find that results are stable over the two types of 
regression regime (i.e., for simple linear and logit 
regression).
Our initial research question had to do with how 
much of Trump’s margins at the state level, which is, 
after all, how elections are decided, could be accounted 
for in terms of general malaise, dissatisfaction or 
despair among the electorate.  We therefore regressed 
Trump’s margin at the state level on two variables: 
one, the percentage of state residents self-identifying 
as Republican; the other, the index measuring overall 
wellbeing. As Table 1 suggests, once the percentage 
8 We had a choice between two variables: one measured the 
degree to which voters considered themselves Republican (with 
strong Republicans being on one end of a 7-category scale and 
strong Democrats being on the other); one measured whether they 
identified as Republican or not.  As it turns out, findings do not 
substantially differ when either indicator is used, but we use the 
latter in the analyses presented here.
9 Quite a few of the variables we analyze are not measured at the 
interval level and those that are, even our dependent variable, 
the candidate for whom people voted, are typically two-category 
dummy variables.
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of Republicans is controlled, the association between 
Trump’s margin and index of overall wellbeing was 
strong, significant and negative (beta = -.19). (See 
Table1.)
Table 1. Regression of Trump Margin by State on 
the Percentage of the State Population Reporting 
That It Is Republican (REPUBLICAN) and Overall 
Wellbeing Index (WELLBEING)
Standardized Regression Coefficients (Betas)
REPUBLICAN     .91***
WELLBEING                -.19***
N of States             50
Adjusted R-square            .92
However, if “ill being,” the opposite of “well being,” 
was a significant predictor of Trump’s margin of victory 
at the state level, the question arises as to what was the 
nature of this “ill being” at the individual level. The 
cultural lag and the cultural backlash perspectives on 
support for populism provide three testable hypotheses. 
Table 2 shows fundamental support, even while it also 
reveals some surprises. We begin with our control 
variables in the regression analyses presented here. 
Comparison between the 2016 and 2012 elections 
suggests that, at the zero-order level, REPUBLICAN (r 
in 2016 = .61; r in 2012 = .64) was slightly less salient in 
the 2016 than in the 2012 election. Race, gender and age 
had about the same salience in the 2016 election as they 
did in the 2012 election.  But the importance of religion 
to a voter was actually considerably more salient in the 
2016 election (r = .26) than it was in 2012 (r = .11). 
People who defined themselves as religious were much 
more likely to vote for Trump than Clinton. They were 
even more likely to do that than religious voters were to 
vote for Romney than Obama.  
Table 2 also offers support for hypotheses derived 
from the cultural lag perspective. However, this support 
is sometimes only evident when one contrasts the 
2016 results with the 2012 results. Thus, the negligible 
correlation between INCOME and a vote for Trump 
in 2016 (r =.01) would not immediately support the 
hypothesis that income affected the 2016 result, if it 
were not for the fact that, by contrast, Romney voters 
tended to have considerably more income than Obama 
voters (r =.14).  As a general rule, Republicans tend to 
be higher earners than Democrats. The 2016 election 
proved to be the rule’s exception, suggesting that many 
income-strapped voters did in fact vote for Trump. 
Similarly, voters without a stock portfolio were only a 
little more likely to vote for Trump than Clinton in the 
2016 election (r for STOCKS = -.07), but, compared to 
the non-existent relationship in the 2012 election (r = 
.00), this difference suggests that Trump’s candidacy was 
relatively effective at drawing voters with little wealth.
The other two hypotheses derived from the cultural 
lag perspective are also supported, but, in this case, the 
support is somewhat undermined by the comparison 
with 2012 results.  It is widely believed, for instance, 
that less educated voters were more likely to vote for 
Trump than Clinton, and the correlation between 
EDUCATION and a Trump vote (r = -.12) supports 
this belief.  But the fact that the correlation between 
EDUCATION and a Romney vote was stronger (r = 
-.16) suggests that education may not have been quite 
as telling in the 2016 election as it was in the 2012 
election.  It is also a common belief that those who felt 
the economy was doing badly were more likely to vote 
for Trump than Clinton, and the correlation between 
ECONOMY and a Trump vote (r = .48) would appear 
to be strong support for this view. But, when one 
sees that the correlation between a Romney vote and 
ECONOMY in 2012 was even stronger (r = .58), one 
is led to entertain the possibility that disappointment 
with the economy’s performance does not completely 
explain Trump’s success, or at least was not as salient a 
factor in the 2016 election as it was in the 2012 election.
 In contrast, the correlation coefficients reported in 
Table 2 show both absolute and relative support for all 
of the hypotheses derived from the cultural backlash 
perspective. BLACKS, measuring the extent to which 
voters disagreed with the statement that “Blacks have 
gotten less than they deserve,” was strongly correlated 
with voting for Trump (r = .54), even more strongly 
than it was with votes for Romney when he was running 
against a black incumbent whom some Americans 
resented (r = .47). Voting for Trump was more highly 
correlated with disagreement with the feeling that gays 
and lesbians should not be discriminated against (r = 
.30) than voting for Romney was (.25), even though, in 
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both cases, the correlation is relatively high.  Negative 
feelings about undocumented immigrants was much 
more strongly correlated with a vote for Trump (r=.44) 
than it was with a vote for Romney (.28), though in 
neither case was the correlation weak.  And negative 
feelings about media attention to discrimination against 
women was much more strongly associated with a vote 
for Trump (.49) than it was with a vote for Romney 
(.35), although, again, in both cases the correlation is 
strikingly high. (See Table 2.)
It is, of course, possible that some of the insights 
available from Table 2 would require modification when 
we examine the associations of independent variables 
with voting behavior, controlling for other variables. 
Table 3 presents the results of regression analyses and, in 
fact, it suggests that some of the insights provided by the 
correlation analyses do need to be reconsidered. Thus, 
for instance, when all other variables are controlled, 
voters were more likely to vote for the Democratic 
candidate in both the 2016 and the 2012 elections if 
religion was important to them (beta for 2016 = -.09, 
for 2012 = -.12).
Crucially, though, the regression analyses continue 
to provide solid support for the cultural backlash 
hypotheses, while they provide more ambiguous support 
for the cultural lag hypotheses.  Thus, the 2016 betas for 
BLACKS, IMMIGRANTS, GAYS, and WOMEN (.17, 
.12, .06 and .16, respectively) are all stronger than their 
counterparts in 2012 (.15, .08, .00, and .08, respectively) 
and statistically significant. Trump voters seem to have 
been unusually unsympathetic to the condition of 
blacks, undocumented immigrants, gays and lesbians, 
and women.  
On the other hand, support for the cultural lag 
hypotheses is less strong in the regression analyses than 
it appeared to be in the correlation analyses. None of the 
betas for INCOME, STOCKS, and EDUCATION (.00, 
-.01, and -.02, respectively) is statistically significant, 
and only the one for INCOME suggests much more 
relative economic deprivation among Trump voters than 
its counterpart (beta = .05) for the 2012 election.  The 
beta for ECONOMY (.20) in the 2016 election strongly 
suggests that Trump voters felt more disappointment 
over the economy’s performance than Clinton voters 
did, but it also suggests less relative disappointment 
than its counterpart (beta = .30) does for Romney 
voters, compared to Obama voters, in the 2012 election. 
(See Table 3.)
DISCUSSION
We find evidence that voting for Trump in the 2016 
election may have been substantially motivated by 
sentiments resulting from economic and technological 
changes that have gotten ahead of American society’s 
ability to adapt—i.e., from cultural lag. We argue that 
the long-term disruption of the job market for the 
working class, especially the white working class, has left 
a considerable portion of the American electorate with 
a sense of malaise. Moreover, our state-level analysis 
suggests that this malaise, this feeling of ill being, was a 
strong correlate of Trump’s margins.
Our individual-level analyses suggest support for 
the notion that Trump’s success had more to do with 
resentments that may have been fostered by economic 
disruption than by lingering economic disadvantages 
themselves.  In terms of income and stockholdings, for 
instance, Trump voters were not different from Clinton 
voters, although their relative economic disadvantage, 
compared to Romney voters in 2012, is notable. 
Relatively speaking, they were slightly less educated 
than Romney voters, but not significantly less educated 
than Clinton voters, when other variables in our analysis 
were controlled. They were much more likely than 
Clinton voters to see the economy as worse off than it 
was the previous year, but, compared to Romney voters 
in 2012, they were not quite as adamant on this point.
We want to point to limitations of our study, 
however, that make suspect its apparent negligible to 
weak support for the view that Trump supporters have 
been more disadvantaged by economic upheaval than 
Clinton supporters. First, and perhaps most important, 
we have no data about the past workplace experiences of 
voters in the 2016.  We cannot say, as a result, what kind 
of dislocations voters may have experienced during the 
Great Recession of 2008/2009, or over the past forty 
or fifty years—and, hence, how these dislocations may 
have been related to their vote in the 2016 Presidential 
election.  Second, we do not have access to data about 
whether voters were unemployed or non-participants 
in the labor force—both better indicators of current 
economic insecurity than any measures we were able to 
employ.  Third, our finding of little difference between 
Trump and Clinton voters in terms of income, wealth 
and education is actually fairly striking, given the 
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Table 2.  Correlates of Trump and Romney Votes
Trump/Clinton       Romney/Obama 
                                 2016                          2012
REPUBLICAN                 .61***             .64***
WHITE      .33***             .34***
GENDER    -.06**                       -.07***
AGE                   .13***             .11***
RELIGION                  .26***             .11***
INCOME                  .01              .14***
STOCKS     -.07***              .00
EDUCATION     -.12***           -.16***
ECONOMY      .48***             .58***
BLACKS        .54***             .47***
IMMIGRANTS     .44***             .28***
GAYS       .30***             .25***  
  
WOMEN      .49***             .35***
Notes: Number of valid cases for 2016 = 2,224, for 2012 = 
1,860. An * indicates significance at the .05 level; A ** indicates 
significance at the .01 level; A *** indicates significance at the 
.001 level. Coding: REPUBLICAN: 1=Republican;  0 = not 
Republican; WHITE: 1 = white;  0 = non-white; GENDER: 
1= female ; 0=male; RELIGION: 1= religion important; 0 = 
religion unimportant; STOCKS: 1= owns stocks;  0 = owns no 
stocks; ECONOMY: higher value indicates greater feeling that 
economy is very bad; BLACKS: higher value indicates greater 
disagreement with statement “Blacks have gotten less than 
they deserve”; IMMIGRANTS: higher value indicates more 
agreement with feelings that unauthorized immigrants are 
felons and should be deported; GAYS: higher values indicates 
more disagreement with feeling that gays and lesbians should 
not be discriminated against on the job; WOMEN: higher 
values indicate greater agreement with feeling that media 
should pay less attention to discrimination against women.
Table 3.  Regression of Trump and Romney Votes on 
Other Variables
             Standardized Regression Coefficients (Betas)
           Trump/Clinton           Romney/Obama
                                               2016                             2012
REPUBLICAN          .33***  .35***
WHITE          .14***  .16***
GENDER    -.02               -.03
AGE       .03*                .02
RELIGION     -.09***               -.12***
INCOME       .00    .05**
STOCKS     -.01                -.04*
EDUCATION     -.02    .01
ECONOMY       .20***  .30***
BLACKS      .17***   .15***
IMMIGRANTS           .12***  .08***
GAYS       .06***  .00
WOMEN      .16***  .08***
N       2211   1844
Adjusted R-square     .61   .61
Notes: Number of valid cases for 2016 = 2,224, for 2012 = 
1,860.  An * indicates significance at the .05 level; A ** indicates 
significance at the .01 level; A *** indicates significance at the 
.001 level.  Coding: REPUBLICAN: 1= Republican;  0 = not 
Republican; WHITE: 1 = white;  0 = non-white; GENDER: 
1= female ; 0 = male; RELIGION: 1 = religion important; 0 = 
religion unimportant; STOCKS: 1= owns stocks;  0 = owns no 
stocks; ECONOMY: higher value indicates greater feeling that 
economy is very bad; BLACKS: higher value indicates greater 
disagreement with statement “Blacks have gotten less than 
they deserve”; IMMIGRANTS: higher value indicates more 
agreement with feelings that unauthorized immigrants are 
felons and should be deported; GAYS: higher values indicates 
more disagreement with feeling that gays and lesbians should 
not be discriminated against on the job; WOMEN: higher values 
indicate greater agreement with feeling that media should pay 
less attention to discrimination against women.
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historic tendency of Republicans to be richer and better 
educated than Democrats. It may actually mean that 
more of the poorer and less-educated voters voted for 
Trump than typically vote for Republican candidates. 
Nonetheless, to the extent that our indicators do tap 
the current economic conditions of voters, we can say 
that we were unable to turn up much evidence that 
those conditions did much to distinguish Trump from 
Clinton voters.
What we did find considerable evidence for is 
the view that Trump voters were more likely to 
express resentments, conceivably resulting from past 
economic challenges, about various minority and/or 
marginalized groups than Clinton voters. This has been 
true of supporters of previous Republican candidates, 
compared to those of their Democratic opponents, as 
our data on the 2012 election affirm.  But the differences 
between the 2016 and 2012 elections suggest that 
Trump voters were unusually likely to have negative 
attitudes towards blacks, immigrants, gays and lesbians, 
and women, even compared to Republican-candidate 
supporters in previous elections.  While we cannot say 
for sure that it was only white voters for Trump who 
had these attitudes, the results do constitute support 
for Arlie Hochschild’s (2016) general contention that 
Trump voters felt resentment towards groups that made 
them feel like “strangers in their own land.”  
CONCLUSION
In general, using the cultural lag perspective, we find 
relatively little support for the contention that Trump 
voters were distinguished from Clinton voters in terms 
of their economic or educational levels.  We find more 
support for the conclusion, also derived from the 
cultural lag perspective, that they were distinguished 
by a relatively bleak view of the economy. However, 
we were surprised to see that their bleak view of the 
economy did less to distinguish them from Clinton 
voters than it did to distinguish Romney from Obama 
voters in the 2012 election.  Future research, however, 
might examine the question of whether Trump voters 
have experienced more economic and/or educational 
deprivation sometime in their past than Clinton 
voters.  Such research might provide a truer test of the 
cultural lag perspective than we were able to achieve in 
our analysis, limited as we were to measures of voters’ 
current economic and educational situations.
We find more evidence for hypotheses based upon the 
cultural backlash perspective.  Trump voters expressed 
greater resentments about blacks, immigrants, women 
and gays and lesbians than did Clinton voters and 
these differences were considerably greater than similar 
ones that distinguished voters in the 2012 presidential 
election.  Unfortunately, the data we analyzed cannot 
help us discern whether these resentments would have 
been detectable before the Trump candidacy or whether 
the Trump candidacy was a necessary condition for 
such resentments becoming notable and noted. 
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